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Abstract 
This article examines the legal framework of consumer credit information systems in the EU 
in view of a single retail credit market. It puts forward the proposition that positive law is 
inadequate to strike a balance between legitimate concerns over consumers' civil liberties, 
institutional guarantees, and the needs of the credit industry.  It suggests that the EU should 
enact industry-specific legislation, and the new consumer credit directive should represent the 
appropriate forum for its regulation. So far, however, the proposed directive maintains the 
status quo and is far from satisfactory, leading to the conclusion that the EU is missing a 
chance to re-think a regulatory model to support a healthy single consumer credit market in 
which consumers receive adequate protection. 
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I. Introduction 
In virtually all the EC Member States, consumer credit reporting has become the most 
extensively used instrument employed by lenders to underwrite decisions on borrowing or the 
supply of goods and/or services to customers.  Lenders, in fact, access credit reference 
databases managed by third party providers (the so-called ‘Credit Reference Agencies’) in 
order to evaluate a consumer’s credit application and his or her creditworthiness. 
Credit Reference Agencies (CRAs) are independent, commercial organisations that are 
deemed to represent an institutional response to the service of the credit industry for the 
problem of asymmetric information in financial markets.  They maintain a full data sharing 
mechanism based on the collection of data from the various lenders of information about their 
customers and, at the same time, provide those same lenders with consumer credit reports 
along with other information services and decision making tools, which make consumers' 
personal data and reputations accessible to other (potential) creditors.2 
Another reason for the credit industry's interest in CRAs is that with their  extensive, detailed 
collection of and their ability to share personal data, they are considered to provide useful 
services in the fight against the growth of over-indebtedness of borrowing individuals. 
One of the most important and distinctive features is that lenders’ consultation of CRAs 
databases, prior to the underwriting of credit, is voluntary and not mandatory by law. 
Against this background, the creation of an efficient EC single market in consumer credit in 
an environment in which consumers receive adequate protection is a present concern on top 
of the agenda for the completion of the Internal Market.  So far, however, the existing 
Consumer Credit Directive 87/102/EEC has proven to be ineffective in reaching this goal.3  
                                                 
2 CRAs usually integrate their databases with data from other public sources, such as, for example, electoral 
rolls, Court judgements, bankruptcies and voluntary arrangements, and other private information provided by 
other organisations, which compile additional information referring to an individual thus forming a single file. 
Such files are then made available in the form of a Credit Report, which is provided to the (potential) lenders for 
a fee paid to the one or more CRAs, which they have decided to interrogate each time someone applies for credit 
or hire purchase. 
3 Directive 87/102/EC for the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the 
member states concerning consumer credit, OJ L 042, 12/02/1987 p. 0048-0053. 
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Thus, the European Commission and the European Parliament have recently presented new 
proposals for a directive on the harmonisation of the laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions concerning credit for consumers.4 
However, despite all the efforts, so far, the Member States have shown few signs of 
agreement, and discussions and counterproposals have lasted for years. 
In this context, existing studies identify the urge for a European single market in consumer 
credit and the creation of cross-border credit opportunities as the main factors behind the 
need for the cross-border exchange of information among information systems. 
At the same time, however, so far there has been scant debate, especially amongst lawyers 
and legislators, concerning the legal framework of such information systems and the uses of 
credit reporting data.  In particular, little attention has been paid either to privacy concerns or 
to the discriminatory consequences of credit reporting.  Such concerns seem particularly 
relevant today because of the growing type and amount of personal data collected and 
disclosed to third parties, coupled with the sophistication and advances in computer 
technology and information systems. 
These aspects are exacerbated by the fragmented market structure and industrial organisation 
of consumer credit reporting across the Community, with special reference to the lack, in 
most Member States, of a form of proper institutionalisation and all the consequences that 
follow. 
Thus, the aim of this work is to assess whether the legal framework in place is adequate to 
strike a balance between legitimate concerns over civil liberties, institutional guarantees, and 
the needs of the credit industry.  Conversely, questions of whether the EC should re-think a 
                                                 
4 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the harmonisation of the laws, 
regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning credit for consumers, COM (2002) 
443 final 2002/0222 (COD);   Modified proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on credit agreements for consumers amending Council Directive 93/13/EC, COM(2005) 483 final 
2002/0222(COD). 
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harmonised, if not uniform, regulatory model for consumer credit reporting seem particularly 
relevant. 
In an attempt to provide such analysis, this article examines the advancements of the 
legislative proposals in place for the harmonisation of consumer credit laws, investigating to 
what extent these are also representing the forum for the regulation of the underlying 
information systems to support an European single market in retail credit in which consumers 
receive adequate protection. 
 
II. Credit Reference Agencies and their role in the economy 
Economic theory has long stressed the importance of information in credit markets.  Theorists 
have devoted a large body of theoretical studies aimed at demonstrating that asymmetric 
information between borrowers and lenders poses problems of bad debts, moral hazard, and 
adverse selection.  They suggest that the lack of information on borrowers can prevent the 
efficient allocation of credit in a market and that one way that lenders can improve their 
knowledge of borrowers is through their observation of clients over time.5 
As the theory goes, CRAs play a pivotal role as a borrower discipline device since borrowers 
know that a default in re-payment compromises his or her reputation with all the other 
potential lenders on the market, resulting in credit with more costly terms or by cutting him 
or her off from credit entirely.  Information sharing would make it easier to predict with a 
certain degree of confidence the future payment behaviour of applicants allowing lenders to 
attract good borrowers and offering them better terms and conditions, thus promoting market 
competition that could ultimately result in benefits to consumers.6 
                                                 
5 J.E. Stiglitz and A. Weiss, ‘Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information’ (1981) 71(3) American 
Economic Review 393-410;   A.N. Berger and G.F. Udell, ‘Relationship Lending and Lines of Credit in Small 
Firm Finance’ (1995) 68 Journal of Business 351-381. 
6 T. Jappelli and M. Pagano, ‘Information Sharing, Lending and Defaults: Cross-Country Evidence’ (2002) 
26(10) Journal of Banking and Finance 2017-2045; D.W. Diamond, 'Monitoring and Reputation: The Choice 
between Bank Loans and Directly Placed Debt' (1991) 99(4) Journal of Political Economy 689-721;   A.A. 
Admati and P.C. Pfleiderer, ‘Forcing Firms to Talk: Financial Disclosure Regulation and Externalities’ (2000) 
13 Review of Financial Studies 479-519. 
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In addition, credit reporting systems are valued as instrumental tools in expanding the breadth 
and depth of financial markets and in strengthening the financial system. They reportedly 
reduce transaction and loan processing costs, the time required to process applications, 
improve the lenders’ client portfolio quality by monitoring it and identifying potential 
problems, provide cost-efficient standardised and objective criteria for credit analysis, 
facilitate distant transactions (for instance, e-finance or internet transactions and banking), 
provide opportunities for new financial products to consumers and enable lenders to serve 
consumers who would be otherwise underserved or ignored (for example low-income 
consumers).  All these aspects, in turn, result in the development and sale of new products, 
and accurate tailored pricing, targeting and marketing, which ultimately would contribute to 
the lenders' profitability.7 
Finally, another reason for the industry's interest in CRAs is that through extensive detailed 
collection and sharing of personal data, they provide useful services in the fight against the 
growth of over-indebtedness for borrowing individuals.  In policy terms, this would confer on 
the credit industry the tools for responsible lending practices, protecting individuals from 
borrowing beyond their means.8 
It should be noted, however, that CRAs take decisive advantage of their ability to provide 
first-hand information and knowledge by offering additional services to the industry that 
involve the use of consumer credit data as the basis for their provision.  Such additional 
services include, among others, credit scoring, consulting, application processing, small 
business information reports, market and consumer research, debt collection, marketing, 
fraud prevention, identity verification of credit applicants (including identity theft detection 
and verification for money laundering), and other private transactions, such as, commercial 
                                                 
7 C. Calari, Vice President, Financial Sector Network, World Bank, 'Foreword', in M.J. Miller (ed.), Reporting 
Systems and the International Economy (MIT Press, 2003), vii; M.J. Miller, ‘Introduction’, in M.J. Miller (ed.), 
op. cit. note 6 supra, 1-2. 
8 For example in the UK, see House of Commons Treasury Committee, ‘Credit Card Charges and Marketing’, 
Second Report of Session 2004-05 (London, 4 February 2005). 
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transactions, property rentals, telecom subscriptions, insurance contracts, and employment 
screening.9 
 
III. Institutional framework 
As extensive economic research has recently demonstrated, European credit markets are far 
from being integrated, a conclusion derived from the existence of a number of legal barriers 
among the Member States, as well as several integration indicators such as real price and 
interest differentials, absence of cross-border lending, poor market penetration by foreign 
lenders, the existence of large differences from country to country in the extension of 
consumer loans, differentials in demand, business models, language, consumers' cultural and 
psychological factors in the use of credit.10 
Overall, therefore, it is not surprising that these differences are reflected noticeably in the 
consumer credit reporting sector, which has mirrored the development of the underlying 
credit markets and has concentrated domestically, neglecting either a European dimension or 
the cross-border exchange of data. 
                                                 
9 See Experian Official Website, available via <http://www.experian.co.uk>;   Equifax Official Website, 
available via <http://www.equifax.co.uk>;   CallCredit Official Website, available via 
<http://www.callcredit.co.uk>.   For literature in business studies, see McNab H. and Wynn A., Principles and 
practice of Consumer Credit Risk Management (CIB Publishing, 2000). 
10 On the fragmentation of consumer credit markets within the EC, see Mercer Oliver Wyman, Consumer credit 
in Europe: riding the wave Research Report, European Credit Research Institute, Brussels, Nov. 2005;  N. 
Jentzsch and A. San José Riestra, Information Sharing and Its Implications for Consumer Credit Markets: 
United States v. Europe Working Paper, European University Institute Workshop ‘The Economics of Consumer 
Credit: European Experience and Lessons from the U.S.’, Florence, May 2003, 15;  L. Weill, Efficiency of 
Consumer Credit Companies in the European Union – A Cross-Country Frontier Analysis ECRI Research 
Report No. 7, European Credit Research Institute, Brussels, 2004, 3-6;   J. Crook, The Demand and Supply of 
Household Debt: A Cross-Country Comparison, Working Paper, European University Institute Workshop ‘The 
Economics of Consumer Credit: European Experience and Lessons from the U.S.’, Florence, May 2003;   L. 
Guiso Consumer Credit and Household Loan Markets Across Italian Regions, Working Paper, European 
University Institute Workshop ‘The Economics of Consumer Credit: European Experience and Lessons from the 
U.S.’, Florence, May 2003;   S. Lea, P. Webley, and C.M. Walker, ‘Psychological Factors in Consumer Debt: 
Money Management, Economic Socialisation, and Credit Use’ (1995) 16(4) Journal of Economic Psychology 
681-701;  N. Diez Guardia, Consumer Credit in the European Union ECRI Research Report No. 1, European 
Credit Research Institute, Brussels, 2002, 7;  K. Lanoo and A. de la Mata Muňoz, Integration of the EU 
Consumer Credit Market – Proposal for a More Efficient Regulatory Model, CEPS Working Document No. 
213, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, Nov. 2004, 3-4;   Buch C.M., Information or Regulation: 
What is Driving the International Activities of Commercial Banks? Kiel Working Paper No. 1011, Kiel Institut 
of World Economics, Kiel, November 2000. 
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Alongside this uneven development of consumer credit, however, the information distribution 
industry seems to present peculiarities of its own in relation to the institutional structure 
serving the markets and the industrial organisation. 
From an institutional point of view, the main differentiating factor on how credit registries 
operate across Europe could be grouped under two main categories based on ownership: (i) 
privately owned CRAs; and (ii) Public Credit Bureaus (PCB) generally managed by central 
banks or other national supervisory authorities.11 
The state of affairs in the EU appears to be a mixed one: while in certain markets only PCBs 
operate, in the majority of them the consumer credit reporting business has been left to free 
market forces.  In some Member States, however, PCBs and CRAs coexist.12  The role and 
activities of CRAs have been already dealt with above in this work. 
By contrast, as far as PCBs are concerned, the Committee of Governors of the European 
Central Bank defines them as information systems ‘‘designed to provide commercial banks, 
central banks, and other regulatory bodies with information about the indebtedness of firms 
and individuals vis-à-vis the whole banking system’’.13 
PCBs are institutions typical of continental Europe, where they first originated and developed 
with the objective of providing an information system for supervisors to analyse financial 
                                                 
11 See M.J. Miller (ed.), op. cit. note 6 supra. 
12 CRAs operate alone in The Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Hungary, Ireland, Malta, Poland, Sweden, 
The Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.  CRAs and PCBs coexist in Germany, Greece, Italy (where a 
consortium of credit providers also operates), Portugal, and Spain.  In Austria and Belgium, a consortium of 
credit providers and a PCB coexist.  PCBs operate alone in Finland (but the operation of the PCB has been 
contracted out to a private company), France, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.  No credit registries 
exist in Cyprus (where there is only a bad-cheque list operated by a PCB), and Luxembourg.  Information 
assembled from the following sources: T. Jappelli and M. Pagano, ‘Public Credit Information: A European 
Perspective’, in M.J. Miller (ed.), op. cit. note 6 supra, 81-114;  M.J. Miller, ‘Credit Reporting Systems around 
the Globe: the State of the Art in Public Credit Registries and Private Credit Reporting Firms’, in M.J. Miller 
(ed.), op. cit. note 6 supra, 25-80;  Mercer Oliver Wyman, op. cit. note 9 supra, 22;  A. San José Riestra, Credit 
Bureaus in Today’s Credit Markets, ECRI Research Report No. 4, European Credit Research Institute, Brussels, 
2002;  Data obtained by the author directly from the World Bank;  CreditInfo Group, Official Website, 
<http://www.creditinfo.com/>;  Tiresias Official Website, <http://www.tiresias.gr/>. 
13 Cited in T. Jappelli and M. Pagano, 'Public Credit Information: A European Perspective', in M.J. Miller (ed.), 
op. cit. note 6 supra, 82. 
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institutions' (banks) portfolios.  Reportedly, Germany established the first PCB in 1934, 
followed by France in 1946, Italy and Spain in 1962, and Belgium in 1967.14 
Although PCBs operate in many respects like the privately owned CRAs, substantial 
differences exist between the two. 
As in the case of private CRAs, there is a two-way flow of customers’ credit data between the 
credit grantors and the PCB.  However, the key difference between PCBs and CRAs is that 
the former are generally managed by central banks or other states’ regulatory authorities.  
Crucially, financial institutions that are under the supervision of a country’s central bank are 
required to report certain credit data on a regular basis to the PCB by law or other regulation.  
Thus, as participation in a PCB is compulsory, its rules are imposed by law or regulation, not 
under contract as occurs with CRAs..15 
Equally, PCBs have a legal basis for demanding that reporting lenders remedy eventual 
inaccuracies or make available missing data.  Failure to comply results in sanctions that, by 
law, PCBs may impose (generally, penalty fees followed by supervisory actions).16 
Indeed, as it will be shown later, such mandatory reporting and rules of participation 
represent a fundamental difference between a PCB and a CRA and have a decisive impact on 
the legal standing of consumer credit reporting. 
From the concise description provided hitherto, it appears clear that the information collected 
by PCBs serves mainly two purposes: (a) to conduct the prudential supervision of banks, 
monitoring the health and soundness of the overall financial system of a country; and (b) to 
assess and monitor the indebtedness of borrowers, both legal and natural persons. 
The first purpose means that PCBs exercise a public function by furthering the general 
stability of the banking and payment system.  As such, only banks participate in the system 
                                                 
14 M.J. Miller, 'Credit Reporting Systems around the Globe: the State of the Art in Public Credit Registries and 
Private Credit Reporting Firms, in M.J. Miller (ed.), op. cit. note 6 supra, 25-80. 
15 T. Jappelli and M. Pagano, Information Sharing in Credit Markets: The European Experience CSEF Working 
Paper No. 35, University of Salerno, Salerno, 2005. 
16 M.J. Miller, 'Credit Reporting Systems around the Globe: the State of the Art in Public Credit Registries and 
Private Credit Reporting Firms, in M.J. Miller (ed.), op. cit. note 6 supra, 25-80. 
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and are subject to the underlying rules, unlike CRAs that also take in non-bank lenders as 
client members.  This public function is alien to the information sharing systems of CRAs 
that are designed to provide services in the interest of the profitability of a larger variety of 
lenders that includes, but is not limited to, banks.  In this respect, CRAs databases are 
accessible by an indefinite number of potential client members, as they are conceived as open 
systems with the additional incentive of bringing an increasing number of subscribers into 
play to respond to competition pressures. 
In a different way, the element above marked as (b) leads to another important difference 
between PCBs and CRAs, namely, that PCBs have universal coverage of all loans above a 
threshold amount determined by law or regulation (such threshold varies from country to 
country), and the information consists of credit data disseminated in consolidated form.  This 
means that, unlike CRAs, lenders have access to the total loan exposure of each borrower, 
there is no detail on individual loans, and no merger with other personal data nor data mining 
occurs.17 
Evidently, legislators did not consider information about credit operations below a certain 
threshold (i.e. small loans and other credit that constitute what today is referred to as 
‘consumer credit’) either a threat for the prudential supervision of a sound national financial 
system or a concern in relation to indebtedness, ‘since small loans have little impact on 
system solvency or risk’.18 
In those countries where PCBs and CRAs coexist, the threshold also demarcates the market 
segment below which CRAs operate without the lenders having the opportunity to turn to 
PCBs, while the same cannot be said as far as it concerns the provision of information above 
such threshold.19  This segmentation, in fact, also enables CRAs to collect and store 
information about operations above the threshold (in detail, rather than in the consolidated 
                                                 
17 Jappelli and Pagano, op. cit. note 14 supra. 
18 M.J. Miller, 'Credit Reporting Systems around the Globe: the State of the Art in Public Credit Registries and 
Private Credit Reporting Firms, in M.J. Miller (ed.), op. cit. note 6 supra, 39. 
19 This, of course, unless a specific law prevents them to do so. 
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form as PCBs).  This is possible because the law, which makes their communication 
compulsory to the competent PCB, says nothing about their collection by others, i.e. it is not 
forbidden.  Distinctively, in this upper market segment, CRAs are able to collect and provide 
their member clients with information with a precise degree of detail (for example, particulars 
of each line of credit a borrower has with reporting lenders) as opposed to the consolidated 
form that PCBs provide by rule of law or regulation.  Again, this advantage is possible, as 
CRAs are not bound by the same rules that fix the functioning of PCBs.20 
 
Within the context of the described institutional organisation, while most countries have just 
one large credit registry dominating the market, some Member States have two or 
(exceptionally) three companies competing on the same national market. 
It should be observed that a common trait shared by credit information systems is that, in 
economic terms, they are natural monopolies in that the extension of a system's coverage 
itself enhances its effectiveness.  In fact, they are dependent on network structures within 
which information is traded, where the participants that share the information constitute such 
a network.21 
Economic research describes networks as a form of industrial organisation and market 
governance.  Jentzsch extensively explains their functioning: 
‘The architecture of the network is constituted of the number of participants as well 
as the symmetry (or asymmetry) of data flows between them and the system of 
information flows. (...) Information diffusion and its efficiency are influenced by 
the network architecture and the channels; hence architecture influences economic 
outcomes. In this context, information is at the same time integrated in vertical 
networks (as part of the value chain) as well as in horizontal networks (exchanges 
                                                 
20 See Jappelli and Pagano, op. cit. note 14 supra. 
21 M. Pagano and T. Jappelli, 'Information Sharing in Credit Markets' (1993) 48(5) The Journal of Finance 
1693-1718. 
 11
among different firms of the same industry).  (...) In credit reporting markets, the 
information flows among agencies, information suppliers and consumers constitute 
such a network of information which reveals strong feedback effects: its value 
increases as more creditors are connected to it’.22 
As the author ultimately clarifies, thus, ‘scale and scope effects also affect coverage, which 
has the propensity to universality. The more sources are connected to the network, the more 
detailed becomes the credit report and the more precise may become the risk prediction’.23 
In sum, the very nature of the credit reporting business demands that the success of the 
system depends on its broad extension, otherwise, it is of no or little use otherwise. 
When looking at the combination of all the factors described in the above survey, though, it is 
noteworthy at this early stage of the discussion that, in most cases, appropriate institutional 
arrangements are absent, having been left to commercial organisations that are monopolistic 
in nature and scope.  This and many other issues, which are exemplified below, cause unease 
over basic consumer freedoms and civil society guarantees. 
 
IV. Concerns 
Intuitively, consumer credit reporting systems represent a threat to the privacy of individuals.  
In fact, there are sophisticated and highly technological mechanisms in place, where data 
from different sources are easily and quickly aggregated, new data are automatically created, 
and data are disclosed to a potentially unlimited number of third parties for a growing number 
of expanding purposes. 
                                                 
22 N. Jentzsch, The Regulation of Financial Privacy: The United States v Europe ECRI Research Report No. 5, 
European Credit Research Institute, Brussels, 2003, 30-31.  According to the author, an increasing number of 
data sources produces a more precise profile of the credit applicant which in turn enhances the risk prediction 
capabilities of the interconnected participants. Thus, the contributions of an increasing number of data providers 
almost inevitably increases the flow of information among the agents.  The more the network of a CRA 
increases, the more attractive it will be for potential participating lenders leading to considerable ‘bandwagon 
effects’ and network externalities. 
23 Ibid., 36 
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Previous research has already stressed that further consideration should be given to what 
constitutes the ‘essential information’ which allows the credit assessment process by 
lenders.24   
In this respect, it would certainly be a useful exercise to assess the necessity and scope of all 
the information collected and disseminated by CRAs for the purpose of predicting the future 
behaviour of a borrower, and matching them with the relation of cause and effect about the 
likelihood of repayments with the contracted interests. 
For example, in an analysis of what constitutes ‘essential information’, one of the main 
questions refers to the distinction between positive and negative data.25  Whereas most people 
may accept the value of sharing negative data as a disciplinary instrument, at least where 
customers are informed and where they provide consent, the issue of sharing positive 
information proves more difficult.26 
More important, however, seems the question of how far a consumer should be forced to 
sacrifice his or her own (not only financial) privacy in the interest of the credit industry (the 
general interest?), bearing in mind that the ‘utilitarian’ concerns of the credit industry cannot 
necessarily prevail over civil liberty and fundamental human rights concerns.  To these ends, 
in fact, it should be taken into account that all privacy rights now benefit from, and should be 
interpreted in light of, Art. 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms.27 
                                                 
24 San José Riestra, op. cit. note 11 supra, 17; G.G. Howells 'Data Protection, Confidentiality, Unfair Contract 
Terms, Consumer Protection and Credit Reference Agencies' (1995) Journal of Business Law 343-359. 
25 An important distinction to be drawn when referring to the type of data collected and distributed by CRAs is 
the one between negative and positive consumer data. Negative data refer to information about defaults on 
payments, delays, delinquencies, bankruptcies etc. That is, information with a negative connotation on the 
payment history and the financial behaviour of the data subject.  Positive consumer data, by contrast, refer to 
information about financial standing, payment history and other details, which do not indicate a default or a late 
payment. 
26 San José Riestra, op. cit. note 11 supra;   Howells, op. cit. note 23 supra. 
27 C 364 (2000), 0001-0022. 
Article 8 - Protection of personal data – states: 
‘1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her. 
2. Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of the consent of the person 
concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law. Everyone has the right of access to data which has 
been collected concerning him or her, and the right to have it rectified. 
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Moreover, the profiling and standardisation of the behaviours of individuals not only appear 
hazardous for the civil rights involved, but also conceited and artificial.  Very often, contrary 
to the very foundations of credit reporting, human behaviours are heterogeneous and 
unpredictable.  As recent research has stressed, in fact, the major factors behind the 
creditworthiness or over-indebtedness of individuals were found to be unforeseen life events, 
such as sudden illness, loss of job, death of someone close, etc. rather than a mismanagement 
of resources.28 
From a different angle, it could be also argued that someone who has had problems in the 
past does not necessarily have problems at present or in the future. Or, an individual also may 
have a low profile credit record from failing to make payments, which are either not due or 
are in conflict with the service provider’s claims.29 
Last, but not least, the mechanisms in place bear important consequences in terms of social 
justice, either by way of absence of equal treatment in the access (or, else, exclusion) to 
credit, or in any event selection, hence discrimination. 
This also seems particularly relevant today in the perspective of the free movement of people 
and the effective mobility of Europeans from a Member State to another.  They should not 
face barriers caused by the lack of information provided by CRAs (or the result of different 
national practices and cultures) and selection different from nationals of the hosting Member 
State, which is discrimination based on nationality. 
Arguably, moreover, when people (particularly, though not exclusively, those at a social 
disadvantage) are refused credit, they should not become more vulnerable to credit at more 
expensive rates and unfavourable contract terms (sometimes to the point of extortionate credit 
deals) or, even worse, to being the victims of usury in the black market. 
                                                                                                                                                        
3. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an independent authority’. 
28 Such consideration has also been expressly stated by the director of data protection and regulatory affairs at 
Credit Reference Agency Experian UK, see M. Bradford M., 'Full data-sharing could stem over-indebtedness 
concerns' (2004) 11 Credit Risk International, 11.   See also San José Riestra, op. cit. note 11 supra. 
29 Examples of such incidents are reported in M. Brignall M., 'Total History of Your Dealings', The Guardian, 
Jobs & Money, Saturday 30 October 2004, London. 
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What is striking is that information about defaults is passed on to CRAs (and then, in turn, 
disseminated) simply by the lenders so affirming, regardless of any judicial hearing having 
taken place, thus raising questions as to whether there is any respect for the certainty and rule 
of law. 
It is useful to remember once more that all the above concerns are exacerbated by the 
consideration that there is no conclusive or at least empirical evidence - nor a certain relation 
of cause and effect - as to the connection between credit reporting and the predictability of 
human behaviour.  What's more, when considering all such issues, one should not forget that 
the use of CRAs databases is not mandatory by law. 
When it comes to a closer look at the existing institutional arrangements, it may appear 
worrying to many that, at least in the majority of the Member States, profit-seeking privately 
owned companies that have a natural tendency to be monopolies are allowed to be the 
repository of all such powers.  Such lack of proper institutional organisation increases the 
concern about the arbitrary positioning of CRAs in the modern society.  One may be tempted 
to think that as civil liberties and social factors are involved, there would be a need for some 
institutional guarantees and/or, as a minimum, accountability measures.  Obviously, this 
raises the difficult question of whether these types of activities should be left to free market 
forces or, on the contrary, should there should be a form of institutionalisation with definite 
and specific rules in place, following the example of PCBs. 
In such a confused situation, how has the law reacted to the many concerns and complex 
issues that arise with credit information reporting?  Is there a case for policy makers to re-
think the institutional and legal framework? 
 
V. The legal standing 
As seen, in many ways, in almost every European country, the development of the credit 
industry has reflected the intuitions developed in the economic theoretical literature, with the 
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addition of the industry's substantial investments in technologies that were not in place when 
data sharing was initially considered. 
At the same time, legislators have not responded with the same speed to the new concerns 
brought by such mechanisms, leaving them under the regulatory umbrella of general 
principles of existing legislation. 
At present, there is no industry-specific law at Community level that regulates credit-
reporting activities.  Legislators across Europe, by contrast, mainly rely on one law that has a 
significant impact on data sharing, namely, the EU Data Protection Directive as transposed in 
national law.30 
However, it is open to discussion, and would require a more detailed country by country legal 
analysis, if data protection legislation is adequate and relevant to the sophisticated and highly 
technological mechanisms of credit reporting, where data are disclosed to a potentially 
unlimited number of third parties for a growing number of expanding purposes. When 
looking at the compliance, however, it is worthy to stress that it seems that consumers do not 
have much choice if they do not want to be refused credit.  The consumer's consent with 
regard to the searches to be carried out in the CRAs’ databases, in fact, seems to be viewed 
both mandatory and/or assumed, i.e. implied consent.  Lenders say that the lack of such 
consent would impede them from taking the credit application any further.  Thus, no consent 
equals no credit, so, essentially it is an enforced consent. 
Moreover, lenders make it a condition of the credit contract that, at a later stage, they have 
the right to pass the information concerning such specific credit line to CRAs, which, in turn, 
have the right to disseminate the same to their client members; such clause seems to be non-
negotiable although alien to the decision of the granting of credit (that has already been taken 
                                                 
30 Directive 95/46/EC, OJ 1995 L 281 p 0031-0050. 
Other laws, regulations, or codes of practices at national level may have an impact on consumer credit reporting, 
although they do not regulate it neither directly nor comprehensively.  In Great Britain, for example, the 1974 
Consumer Credit Act does not address the issue of data collection, processing, and dissemination. 
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positively).  Again, it seems that no agreement to such clause means that there will be no 
contract. 
Moreover, there is the issue mentioned above about what constitutes the ‘essential 
information’ (if any), which allows the credit assessment process by lenders, as no rule exists 
and potentially all information could be claimed as 'useful'. In this respect, it would be crucial 
to assess the necessity and scope of all the types of information collected and disseminated by 
CRAs for the purpose of predicting the future behaviour of a borrower, and matching them 
with the causal nexus about the likelihood of repayments with the contracted interests.  
In sum, the number of actors involved, the nature of the data processed and disseminated, the 
complex technologies of credit information systems, and the consequences of the use of 
credit reporting, coupled with the many different activities that CRAs carry on, may 
legitimately induce the conclusion that data protection legislation is inadequate, and specific 
regulation of this market is necessary to avoid the arbitrary processing and dissemination of 
consumer credit information. 
At any rate, the data protection legislation cannot solve, or at least balance, the other concerns 
that are not privacy-related, such as, those about the absence of guarantees and accountability 
measures that institutionalisation would bring to the sector. 
 
VI. Proposals for a new Consumer Credit Directive: a solution in sight? 
Against the background provided above, one may be tempted to think that laws relating to 
consumer credit, by their nature, should include the regulation of the underlying information 
sharing arrangements. Unexpectedly, however, until now, these have been excluded from the 
provisions. 
Adopted in 1987, the Consumer Credit Directive 87/102/EEC established a legal framework 
for consumer credit throughout the EU with the aim of promoting a common market for 
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credit and creating an environment in which consumers receive adequate protection.31  
Significantly, no provision or mention of consumer information sharing was made. 
Directive 87/102/EEC has been amended twice, in 1990 and in 1998, but again no action in 
relation to consumers’ data was taken on these occasions. 
Driven by the failure of Directive 87/102/EEC to integrate European markets effectively, the 
European Commission presented on 11/09/2002 a proposal for a new Directive on the 
harmonisation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions concerning credit for 
consumers (the ‘Proposal’).32 
The Proposal aimed ‘to pave the way for a more transparent market, a more effective market 
and to offer such a degree of protection for consumers that the free movement of offers of 
credit can occur under the best possible conditions both for those who offer credit and those 
who require it’.33 
The text spelled out a comprehensive set of provisions that would have affected the way the 
consumer credit industry and market function, including consumer credit reporting. 
In particular, in Chapter III of the Proposal titling ‘Protection of Privacy’, Article 7 
(Collection and Processing of Data) stated: 
‘Personal data obtained from consumers, guarantors or any other person in 
connection with the conclusion and management of agreements covered by this 
directive, and in particular by Article 6 (1), may be processed only for the purpose 
of assessing the financial situation of those persons and their ability to repay’.34 
                                                 
31 Directive 87/102/EC for the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the 
member states concerning consumer credit, OJ L 042, 12/02/1987, 0048-0053. 
32 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the harmonisation of the laws, 
regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning credit for consumers, COM (2002) 
443 final 2002/0222 (COD). 
33 Ibid, Explanatory Memorandum, 4. 
34 Ibid.  In turn, Article 6(1) – Exchange of Information in Advance and duty to provide advice - of the Proposal 
provided: ‘Without prejudice to the application of Directive 95/46/EC, and in particular Article 6 thereof, the 
creditor and, where applicable, the credit intermediary may request of a consumer seeking a credit agreement, 
and any guarantor, only such information as is adequate, relevant and not excessive, with a view to assessing 
their financial situation and their ability to repay.  The consumer and guarantor shall reply accurately and in full 
to any such request for Information’. 
 18
The following Article 8 (Central Database), innovatively bringing into play either CRAs or 
PCBs depending on the various institutional arrangements of each Member State, specified: 
‘1. Without prejudice to the application of Directive 95/46/EC, Member States 
shall ensure the operation on their territory of a central database for the purpose of 
registration of consumers and guarantors who have defaulted. This database may 
take the form of a network of databases. 
Creditors must consult the database prior to any commitment on the part of the 
consumer or guarantor, subject to the restrictions referred to in Article 9. The 
consumer and, where appropriate, the guarantor shall, if they so request, be 
informed of the result of any consultation immediately and without charge. 
2. Access to the central database in another Member State shall be ensured under 
the same conditions as for firms and individuals in that Member State, either 
directly or via the central database of the home Member State’.35 
The Proposal, finally, introduced in Article 9 the principle of responsible lending, based on 
the requirement that a lender has ‘previously assessed, by any means at his disposal, whether 
the consumer and, where appropriate, the guarantor can reasonably be expected to discharge 
their obligations under the agreement’.36 
In practice, the introduction of the rather difficult – and controversial - concept of 
‘responsible lending’ would have represented an obligation for the ‘good lender’ to consult 
centralised credit databases and to examine the responses provided by the consumer and 
eventually the guarantor. 
                                                 
35 Ibid.  Importantly, Article 8 further specifies in its third limb that ‘personal data received under 
paragraph 1 may be processed only for the purpose of assessing the financial situation of the consumer and 
guarantor and their ability to repay. The data shall be destroyed immediately after the conclusion of the 
credit or surety agreement or the refusal by the creditor of the application for credit or the proposed 
surety’.  Article 8 then concludes by clarifying that ‘the central database referred to in paragraph 1 may 
include the registration of credit agreements and surety agreements’. 
36 Ibid. 
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The above three provisions of the Proposal would have been interesting grounds for a 
discussion and detailed analysis for this work and its subject matter, but for the fact they were 
suppressed in the modified version presented after rejection of the Proposal on 11/09/2003 by 
the Legal Affairs Committee of the European Parliament and its consequent withdrawal by 
the Commission.37 
On 10/10/2005, in fact, the Commission presented, pursuant to Article 250(2) of the EC 
Treaty, a modified proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
credit agreements for consumers, amending Council Directive 93/13/EC (the ‘Amended 
Proposal’).38 
As a whole, the Amended Proposal has revolutionised the original Proposal.  As far as 
consumer information sharing is concerned, the former Article 7 has been completely erased 
and the former Article 6 has been incorporated with substantial modifications in the new 
Article 5(1): 
‘The creditor and, where applicable, the credit intermediary shall adhere to the 
principle of responsible lending. Therefore, the creditor and, where applicable, the 
credit intermediary, shall comply with their obligations concerning the provision of 
pre-contractual information and the requirement for the creditor to assess the 
consumer’s creditworthiness on the basis of accurate information provided by the 
latter, and, where appropriate, on the basis of a consultation of the relevant 
database. (Emphasis added.) 
Where the credit agreement allows the creditor to change the total amount of credit 
after the date of conclusion of the credit agreement, the creditor shall update the 
                                                 
37 Committee on Legal Affairs and the Internal Market, P5_TA-PROV(2004)0297, (A5-0224/2004 - 
Rapporteur: Joachim Wuermeling) PE 338.483, ‘European Parliament legislative resolution on the proposal for 
a European Parliament and Council directive on the harmonisation of the laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions of the Member States concerning credit for consumers (COM(2002) 0443 – C5-0420/2002 – 
2002/0222(COD). 
38 Modified proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on credit agreements for 
consumers amending Council Directive 93/13/EC, COM(2005) 483 final 2002/0222(COD) 
 20
financial information at his disposal concerning the consumer and shall assess the 
consumer’s creditworthiness before any significant increase in the total amount of 
credit’.39 
 
As was made clear in the Explanatory Memorandum of the Amended Proposal, the obligation 
to set up national credit reference databases has been deleted, ‘since this would go beyond the 
purpose of this Directive.  Issues relating to data protection are already dealt with in the Data 
Protection Directive 95/46/EC.  Therefore, the Commission proposes to guarantee only a 
mutual access to existing private and public databases on a non-discriminatory basis’.40 
In the intention of the legislator, this simply means that the Amended Proposal requires all 
existing consumer credit databases to be opened up to EU credit providers on a non-
discriminatory basis, instead of requiring the setting up of new consumer credit databases at 
national levels.41 
Finally, as regards the controversial concept of ‘responsible lending’, the Amended Proposal 
has modified the initial formulation requiring lenders to give standardised information about 
important elements, such as annual percentage interest rate, fees and monthly repayments 
when advertising consumer credit products.  It also obliges lenders to give consumers 
comprehensive information about credit agreements expeditiously before they sign the 
contract, document the agreement properly and keep the consumers properly informed about 
their respective rights and obligations under the agreement throughout their credit 
relationship. These information requirements, coupled with the right to cancel a credit 
agreement within fourteen days of signing it, are intended to help consumers avoid taking on 
more debt than they can afford.  In addition to these core requirements, the revised law 
                                                 
39 Ibid., Article 5(1). 
40 Ibid., Explanatory Memorandum, 6;   See also Ibid., Article 8(1) Database Access. 
41 European Commission MEMO/05/361 Date 10/10/2005 available at 
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/05/361&format=HTML&aged=0&langua
ge=EN&guiLanguage=fr 
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demands that lenders check a consumer’s creditworthiness before concluding a credit 
agreement with him or her, without imposing any specific means among the many that could 
be used (CRAs, indeed, are just one possibility).42 
 
 
VII. Concluding Remarks: missing a chance? 
What strikes a commentator's attention straightaway is that, throughout the discussions that 
have taken place at EU level over consumer credit information systems, there was no mention 
at all of the institutional side and the problems concerned that this - or, better, the absence of 
it - raises.  It seems like that no consideration was given to the function that the organisations 
serving the market carry out.  A basic question should be asked: do CRAs exercise a public 
function for the benefit of all, the industry and consumers alike, or rather do they not simply 
provide services for the benefit of the profitability of lenders? In the former circumstance, in 
fact, debates over a form of institutional governance, at a minimum, should have occurred.  
If, however, this is not the case, it poses the serious problem of what role CRAs really have in 
the consumer credit sector. Do they exercise a function similar to that of private investigators 
at the service of the industry?  Should the latter be the case, then there could be grounds for 
propositions ranging from the extremist ones to outlaw CRAs to more moderate ones to 
introduce industry-specific laws covering the many aspects that consumer credit reporting 
entails. 
Whatever the case may be, surprisingly, it emerged from the discussions over the Proposal 
and the following Amended Proposal that the position of the relevant European institutions, 
after consultation with the industry, was to voluntarily omit the regulation of consumer credit 
reporting from the context of a consumer credit law for the single market, with the result that 
it would substantially leave the status quo in the sector. 
                                                 
42 Ibid. 
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As this work has stressed, however, it is doubtful that consumer credit reporting complies 
with the requirements of data protection legislation, and in any event such law seems 
inadequate to bring a balance to the sector, solving the number of concerns that affect 
individuals and the larger European society alike. 
Thus, is the EU missing a chance to re-think a new regulatory model to support a healthy 
single market in retail credit in which consumers receive adequate protection? 
Certainly, the new consumer credit directive should represent the appropriate forum for a 
public debate.   And, subsequently, legislative intervention should occur that will not only 
require lenders to be placed in a condition to operate in the whole Community without being 
subject to extraneous legal requirements and/or natural barriers, but that will also necessitate 
legal certainty, legitimisation, and appropriate institutional guarantees for all the actors 
involved, in primis consumers. 
For these reasons, the results of the Amended Proposals are far from satisfactory.  This is 
provided, of course, that consumer credit information sharing is really the answer to 
responsible lending practices in an efficient and thriving consumer credit market, a 
circumstance that should be still demonstrated by way of conclusive evidence of a relation of 
cause and effect or, at least, empirically. 
